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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF CASE
This proceeding was

initiat~d

by Galen J. Ross, the person-

al representative of the decedent, to determine the validity of inter
vivos gifts of certain shares of corporate stock made by the decedent
David E. Ross to hi.s son E. Roderick Ross, respondent herein.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Evidence propounded by respondent and by appellants David

E. Ross and Betsy Louise Ross Rapps, the only other heirs of decedent, was heard on August 24, 1979 and August 29, 1979, before
the Honorable David B. Dee in the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake Cotmty.

Following that hearing, counsel for both

parties briefed and argued relevant legal issues.

After thought-

ful consideration of both factual and legal issues presented, the
lower court held that complete and valid inter vivos gifts of the
3ubject corporate stock were supported by clear and convincing
evidence.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent E. Roderick Ross seeks an affirmance of the
lower court's ruling which held that complete and valid inter vivos
gifts were made by decedent to respondent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' statement fails to recite accurately and
completely several critical pieces of evidence which, no doubt,
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had significant persuasive impact on the trial court judge.

Omit-

ted are five separate incidents showing both the decedent's clear
intent and his objective acts in making final and complete gifts
to respondent.
~

Two of these incidents took place between the decedent and

Galen Ross in February of 1978.

Galen testified that one afternoon

the decedent came into Galen's office and stated that he was going
to complete the transfer of shares in the family corporations to his
son Rod.

Around 2:00 a.m. the next morning, the decedent appeared

at Galen's house with stock certificates ready for execution to complete a transfer of shares.

The certificates were made out in

respondent's name and reflected share ownership in Insurance Investment, National Housing and Finance Syndicate, and Equitable Investment.

At decedent's request, Galen, as an officer of each of the

companies, executed the certificates.

Galen recalls that the dec-

edent then said to him,
"Now that I have got this gift to Rod taken care
of, the stock transferred to Rod, I want you to
make me my will and I want you to do it tomorrow."
(R. 217, 218, 230, and 231). (Emphasis added).
Another important conversation took place around February
18, 1978 between the decedent and his niece,

Di·a.~me

Ross Worthen.

The decedent told Dianne that on the previous day he had made gifts
of stock in Equitable Investment, Insurance Investment, and National
Housing and Finance Syndicate to Rod.

He then related in some de-

tail the reasons why he had made these gifts.

He had worked closely
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1i

in the family business with his son Rod and he was proud of Rod's
performance.

Apparently, so Dianne relates, the decedent also ex-

pressed some dismay that this other two children had not visited
him in Utah, especially during the period of his final illness.
(R. 310-311).

Also omitted is the significant testimony of Rod Ross that
sometime in February of 19 7 8 he was- handed some of the certificates
of the shares being given to him.

As the transcript reveals:

"Q: (by Mr. Wheeler) Did you have any of the stock
except for the Ross Brothers Corporation stock handed to you in person where you actually took the stock?
A:

Actually physically held the stock?

Q:

Yes.

A: One or two of either Insurance Investment,
Equitable Investment or National Housing, I had
actual physical contact with, yes.

Q:

One or two of those?

A:

That's correct.

Q:

You don't know which one?

A:

~o.

Q:

And who - from whom did you obtain this stock?

A:

From my father.

Q:

Do you recall when that occurred?

A:

The middle of February, 1978.

(R. 274-275).

Appellants also fail to describe an important portion of the
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organization meeting of Ross Brothers Corporation.

Both Galen Ross

and Dianne Worthen testified that Rod was handed a certificate for
250 shares of the Ross Brothers stock.

In response to Dianne's

question why Rod was being given so many shares, David Ross replied that it was his intent to give Rod a larger portion of the
shares which he held in the family corporations.
ed his motive as follows:

He also explain-

he was giving Rod, by inter vivos gifts,

one-fourth of all of his share holdings in the family corporations;
he would then leave the balance, or three-fourths of his original
holdings, to his three children in equal shares so that each child
would take one-third of the remaining shares.

The effect of this

plan of distribution would be to give Rod, after receipt of both
the lifetime gifts and the testamentary distribution, one-half of
his father's share holdings in the family corporations.

(Testimony

of Galen J. Ross, R. 213-214; testimony of Dianne Ross Worthen, R.
308-309).
The evidence
he said he would do.

is clear that the decedent actually did what
With each of the five companles, Rod re-

ceived exactly one-fourth of the shares belonging to his father
at the. time of each gift.

After distribution of the shares still

:~

belonging to his father's estate, Rod will own one-half of his
father's original share holdings in the family companies.

(Find-

ings of Fact 23(c), R. 116-117; Exhibit 38).
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LEGAL ARGUMENT
A.

The trial court correctly interpreted the evidence

and properly applied Utah law when it held that decedent made valid
inter vivos gifts of stock to his son Rod Ross.
The ruling of the trial court was clearly correct on all
points of Utah inter vivos gift law which holds that a valid gift

·.requires (1) a clear intent and (2) some demonstrative act showing

: the donor's relinquishment of ownership in the property being given.l

This Court articulated these requirements in Helner State

: Bank v. Crus, 95 Utah 320, 81 P.2d 359, 365 (1938):
[The donor] must have intended that some title,
either legal or equitable, should pass to [the
donee] during his lifetime, and in addition to
merely having such intention, he must have performed some act or acts which indicated his intention to pass such title to her during his
lifetime. (Citations omitted; emphasis added).
To the same effect, Christensen v. Ogden State Bank, 75 Utah
471, 286 P. 638, 643 (1930) stated that the donor must intend that
t either

the legal or equitable title pass to the donee during the

donor's life tit:le and that " [ t] he re must be some act performed by
.the donor which indicates his intention to vest in the donee

: some right to the property during the life of the donor."
added).

(Emphasis

The Court went on to note, "The courts are not in agreement

·as to what acts are necessary for a donor to perform in order that
1Acceptance of a gift that is beneficial to the donee is ordinarily
presllllled. Sims v. George, 24 Utah 2d 102, 466 P.2d 831, 833 n.7
(1970); See also, Annotation,23A.L.R.2d 1171 (1952).
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h:t.s intention shall be given effect."

Id.

In deciding whether the requirements have been met, this
Court has not engaged in mechanical analysis of artificial categories, but has focused on all the facts and circumstances present-

ii

ed at trial.
'As pointed out by the courts, each case in which
a gift is involved must, to a large extent, be
controlled by its own peculiar facts and circumstances. While it is true that certain forms of
law must be complied with, yet it is also true
that the intention of the donor must also receive
due consideration and effect, and if in making a
gift he has substantially complied with the latter,
and it is clear that he intended to make a gift, his
intentions must prevail.'
Helper State Bank v. Crus, 95 Utah 320,81 P.2d 359, 366 (1938)
quoting from Boyle v. Dinsdale, 45 Utah 112, 143 P. 136 (1914).
Accord, Holman v. Deseret Savings Bank, 41 Utah 340,124 P. 765, 768
(1912).
Cons is tent with the approach in Crus, this Court has held

::!

~!

':'.~

on numerous occasions that delivery itself is essentially a matter
of intent.

When the Court must determine whether an act is suffi-

cient to constitute "delivery," the intent of the donor in perform- :::
ing the act is critical.
'[Delivery] is the act, however evidenced, by
which the instrument takes effect and title thereby passes.'
Mower v. Mower, 93 Utah 390, 288

P. 914 (1924)(citation omitted).

On both the necessary points of Utah law, respondent car-

ried his burden of proof.

The evidence on intent was overwhelming,

and appellants concede that "this Court could find substantial evi-
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dence to support the lower court's conclusion of intent and accept-

ance."

(Brief of Appellants, p. 12).
The record is equally replete with undisputed evidence of

clear and demonstrative acts by the decedent showing that he divested

himself completely of ownership of the shares being given to Rod.
First, the decedent did everything necessary to make complete transfers of the stock on the corporate books and records of
each of the corporations. (Finding of Fact No. 22, R. 116).

In each

case the decedent surrendered his certificate; the old certificate
in the decedent's name was cancelled; a new certificate was issued
in Rod's name and another in the name of his father for the balance
of the shares; all proper transfers were made in stock record books;

and, in those cases where stock ledger sheets were kept_ for individual
share holders, appropriate entries were made.

(Findings of Fact Nos.

:3,4,5,6,10,14,15,16,17,18,19)20,21,22; R. 111-116).

Appellants suggest that decedent's meticulous completion
,of the transfers on the stock record books does not prove that the

decedent wished to divest himself of ownership of those shares.
They argue that decedent could have "undone" all of these transactions.
Their argument is curious.

There is no evidence in the

.record that the decedent ever attempted to "undo" any of these
transactions.

Moreover, if his father really had only tentative

thoughts about making gifts to Rod, why would he have gone to the
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trouble of making the transfers complete.
Their argument is also logically deficient.

Appellants

assert that because there is a remote possibility decedent could
have done the opposite of what he actually did, one should infer
that he intended the opposite of what he did.

Without proof,

the argument means nothing.
Second, the certificate for the Ross Brothers shares and
one or possibly two certificates in National Housing and Finance
Syndicate, Equitable Investment, and Insurance Investment were
actually physically handed to Rod Ross.

The Ross Brothers certi-

ficate was handed to Rod by Galen Ross at that company's organization meeting in December of 1977.

(R. 213-214).

Sometime

in February of 1978, Rod's father handed him one or two of the
certificates for the Insurance Investment, Equitable Investment, and
National Housing and Finance Syndicate shares being given to Rod.

(R. 274-275).
Third, while the decedent had physical possession of the
certificates representing the disputed shares at the time of his
death, the record reveals that such custody was consistent with
gifts of the stock having been completed.

Under the circumstances,

' •:

the decedent's custodial care of the certificates does not indicate
that he wished to control the shares, to retain ownership, or to
revoke the gifts made to Rod.

Rather, the nature of the custody

demonstrates that the decedent treated those certificates as if
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ownership of the shares was vested in Rod Ross.

To understand

the significance of the decedent's custody of the certificates,
it is helpful to briefly review the evidence about the Ross family
arrangement for keeping the family stock certificates.
It is important to note, first, that the decedent maintained the certificates for all members of the family.

He kept the

certificates of his brother Galen; those of his nephews and nieces,
the children of his deceased brother, Ray; his own certificates; and
those of Rod.

(Findings of Fact Nos. 24, 25, R. 118).

Thus, he had

custody of a large number of family certificates to which he clearly
had no claim of ownership or control.
cates belonging to, say, Galen

His custody of the certifi-

did not, of course, mean that the

decedent had any claim to the shares represented by these certificates.

Indeed, the only fair inference to be drawn is that the de-

cedent kept Rod's certificates because he kept all the family
certificates, and not because he either felt he "owned" or

controlled

the shares or because he wished to revoke the gifts to Rod.
Moreover, nothing distinguished the physical custody of
Rod's certificates from custody of certificates belonging to other
family members; David Ross followed the same procedure for all certificates in his custody.

Certificates of each. family member were

placed in an envelope with a notation as to the name of the owner,

name of the company, the certificate ntnnber, and the number of shares.
This procedure was followed with Galen's shares, with Dianne's shares,
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with Earl's shares; it was also followed with Rod's shares.
Finally, Rod exercised all the prerogatives of ownership
and control on the Equitable Life and Casualty shares during his
father's lifetime.

He received and spent cash dividends.

ceived a stock dividend.

He re-

He also attended shareholder's meetings

and voted the shares in his name.

(See Findings of Fact Nos. 7,8,

R. 113-114).
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, together with respond·:

ent's evidence of donative intent, the trial court concluded that
David Ross' gifts of corporate stock to his son Rod were valid and
complete.

That decision is entirely consistent with Utah inter

vivos gift law discussed earlier in this brief.
B.

Appellants' statement of the Utah law of inter vivos

gifts is incorrect.
Appellants do not dispute that (1) David Ross had a clear
present intent to divest himself of ownership of the shares of
stock in question and that (2) he performed numerous acts to carry
out his stated intent, including surrender of his own stock
certificates, issuance of new certificates in the donee's name, and
changing of the corporate books to reflect the change in ownership.
Rather, appellants urge this Court to rule as a matter of law that
an attempted inter vivas gift of corporate stock fails where the
donor neglects to perform a symbolic ritual of manual delivery comparable to the ancient rite of "livery of seisen."
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The argument is made in two presumably different ways.

Appel-

lants first assert that respondent has failed to establish the
validity of the eifts by clear and convincing evidence.

Second,

appellants contend that the law of a majority of jurisdictions, including Utah, requires actual physical delivery of stock certificates
for a valid inter vivos gift of corporate stock.
Both of these arguments fail.

The first reveals a mistmder-

standing of both the nature of the clear and convincing standard
and also of the degree of proof necessary to satisfy the standard.

The second argument is a misstatement of the law.
(1)

Clear and convincing evidence supports the facts found

by the lower court.

Appellants correctly point out that under Utah law the
donee has the burden of proving an inter vivos gift by "clear
and convincing" evidence.

Appellants do not, however, support their

proposition that respondent failed to meet this burden.

Indeed,

appellants' argument on the point is unclear and confusing.
Since appellants do not dispute any of the basic facts
fotmd by the trial court, their argument on burden of proof can
1

only mean one of two things:

(a)

That respondent failed to prove an essential

element of his case; or
(b)

That as a matter of law respondent did not

offer proof adequate to satisfy the "clear and convincing" standard.

-11-
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If appellants mean the former, they are merely restating
their assertion that Utah law requires a manual deliver of stock
certificates being given by decedent.
of law.

This argument raises a question

Appellants' position, as discussed in other parts of this

brief, is incorrect.
If appellants mean the second alternative, they suggest that
the "clear and convincing" standard is more burdensome than it
really is.

Appellants obliquely suggest that the clear and convinc-

ing evidence standard approximates the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.

This is, of course, an inaccurate statement of the

matter.

The clear and convincing standard requires that the proponent :
of disputed facts convince the trier of fact "that the existence of
the disputed facts are very highly probable .

"

Lovett v.

Continental Bank and Trust Company, 4 Utah 2d 701, 286 P.2d 1065
(1955).

This standard is a comparative degree of certainty higher

thant the "preponderance of evidence" standard, yet lower than the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.

Id. 2

2 cf. Justice Wolfe in Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P.2d
194, 204 (1949):
That proof is convincing which carries with it,
not only the power to persuade the mind as to the
probable truth or correctness of the fact is purports to prove, but has the element of clinching
such truth or correctness. Clear and convincing
proof clinches what might otherwise be only probable to the mind.

-12-
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Significantly, while defining the comparative degrees of
certainty of proof, this Court has recognized that whenever facts
are disputed, findings of fact must be based on probabilities rather
than on absolute certainties.

Id.

The duty to determine whether evidence is clear and convincing rests with the trial court.

After hearing the evidence

in this matter, the lower court determined that respondent had met

'

the requisite degree of proof of the facts enumerated in the findings.

m;

!~support

On appeal, the test of the sufficiency of the evidence to

the lower court's findings is whether the evidence is

reasonably sufficient.

~!

Lovett v. Continental Bank and Trust Company,

4 Utah 2d 76, 286 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1955).

'~I

See also, Holman v.

Deseret Savings Bank, 41 Utah 340, 124 P. 765 (1912).
(2)

Actual physical delivery of the certificates is not

required for a valid inter vi vos gift of stock.
v.

Appellants argue that Utah and a majority of other juris, dictions require manual deli very of certificates to complete a
1li
~:

valid inter vivos gift of stock.

As their brief states at page 20:

"Thus the overwelming majority of states require
an actual transfer and delivery of the stock
certificate itself before a gift of stock is dee~ed.
to have occurred. Utah is numbered among the maJority
of states which have adopted this requirement."
The Utah cases cited by appellants simply do not support
their proposition.

Rasmussen v. Sevier Valley Canal Company, 40

Utah 371, 121 P. 741 (1912) held that an oral order by the decedent to the corporation to trans fer his stock ownership on the corporate records to his son's name was sufficient for a valid transfer
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of the stock where no certificates of stock were ever issued.
Appellants' version of the holding of Rasmussen is obviously
incorrect since no certificates were ever issued.
The two remaining cases cited by appellants do not even
deal with inter vivos gifts.

Both Brown v. Wright, 48 Utah 633,

161 P. 448 (1916) and Gowans v. Rockport Irrigation Company, 77 Utah
198, 293 P. 4 (1930) hold that in a commercial setting, actual physi·
cal delivery of certificates presenting shares of stock is sufficient
to transfer title.
Contrary to appellants' assertion, a majority of jurisdiction
hold that a complete gift of stock can be made without an actual
manual delivery of the certificates.
1174 (1952).

Annotation, 23 A.L.R.2d 1171,

At least thirty states, as well as several federal

courts, have adopted this view.

Id.

38 Am.Jur.2d, Gifts, Section 51 (1968), states the majority
rule:
Generally, there is a complete gift of
corporate stock where, by the direction of
its owner, it has been transferred to the donee
on the books of the corporation and a new certificate issued in the name of the donee, or where a
certificate is issued in the first instance in
the name of the donee, even though the certificate
so issued is retained by the donor or t·he corporation,
and not delivered to the donee. Thus, where a
donor causes a certificate of stock to be issued
in the name of the donee, retaining possession
thereof himself, but at all times regarding
the certificate as the property of the donee and
his own possession as that of a trustee of the
donee, the delivery to himself as trustee of the
doneee is sufficient to complete the gift. Similarly,
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I

a completed gift of corporate stock is made by causing it to be issued in the name of another, even
though the certificates are not detached from the
stock book and are not delivered to the donee, but
remain in the custody of the corporation, and the
donee is ignorant of the transaction at the time.
(Citations omitted.)

i Accord, Annotation, 99 A.L.R. 1077 (1935).
I

In a frequently cited case, Phillips v. Plastridge,

li

l• 107 Vt. 267, 179 A. 157 (1935), a widow sought to compel an alleged
r

rn

donee to account for proceeds from stocks the widow claimed to be
part of the decedent's estate.

The facts showed that decedent

1~had conveyed property to a granite company in exchange for
,shares of its initial capital stock.

~:

He

di~ected

121

that 100 of those

l'.

shares be issued in the name of his daughter.

1

were so issued, but remained in the possession of the corporation

i;

until after the donor's death.
j~

The certificates

The lower court found that there

was a completed gift from the decedent, Phillips, to his daughter.
Affirming on appeal, the Vermont court reasoned:
So there was [a completed gift]. Phillips
had divested himself of all right and title to
the stock and the complete ownership had passed
to his daughter. It was his voluntary act,
affording an inference of the existence of
a donative intent. Under the circumstances,
a manual delivery of the certificates was not
necessary. In Roberts' Appeal, 85 Pa. ·8~, 86,
it is said: "The gift is complete by the.delivery of the thing itself, for transferring
the shares to her upon the books of the company
is putting her in complete possession of the
thing assigned, and clothing her with the complete
legal title. It stands in the place of a delivery. Such an act performs precisely the

-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

office which an actual delivery would perform if
it were a chattel. It is as complete a delivery as
the nature of the thing will admit of. There can
be no clearer evidence of a design to part with
the right of property in favor of another than an
absolute transfer of the legal title to her for her
own use. . . . The certificates were but secondary evidence of her ownership, and only useful
for purposes of transfer. They were nothing more
than the official declaration by the company
of what already appeared on their books. There
was here no locus poenitentiae. He [the donor]
could not have used the certificates, nor could
any one have used them except Miss Foster [the
donee].
179 A. at 158.

Similarly, McClements v. UcClements, 411 Pa. 257, 191
A.2d 814 (1963),was an action by a widow seeking to have a constructive trust for her benefit charged on seventy-five shares
of corporate stock held by her sons.

The evidence showed

that

the father had transferred the ownership of the stock on the books
of the family corporation from himself to one of his sons and
had directed that son to distribute the shares equally among the
three sons.
certificates.

There was no evidence of actual delivery of the
On appeal from a judgment for defendants, the

plaintiff argued that lack of physical delivery was decisive on the
issue of validity of the gift.

The Pennsylvania court held that

transfer on the corporate books was a delivery sufficient to
divest the owner of all dominion over the property.

The gift was,

therefore, upheld.
Simonton v. Dwyer, 167 Ore. 50, 115 P.2d 316 (1941), presents a fact situation strikingly similar to the facts before
this Court.

There, in suits brought by two daughters of the
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decedent for declaratory judgment of ownership of shares of stock
in a family corporation, the daughters presented evidence showing
that their father had surrendered his certificates to the corporation, had them canceled, and directed issuance of new stock
certificates in the name of the daughters.

Further, the evidence

showed that although the father kept possession of the certificates representing the disputed shares, he had told several
witnesses that he had made gifts of the shares to his daughters.

One daughter had no knowledge of the gift until after her father's
death.

The lower court found the gifts valid and complete.
On appeal, opponents of the gifts argued that the

father's failure to deliver the certificates and his custody
of them during his lifetime rendered the gifts ineffectual.
Addressing this issue, the Oregon court stated:
The contention that the manual delivery
of these stock certificates by the donor to
the donee was necessary to constitute a valid
gift is not well taken.
It must be remembered that the usual and
ordinary way of making a gift of corporate
stock is for the holder of a certificate to
indorse the same and to deliver it to the
donee. In that case, the delivery of the
indorsed certificate is essential to the
validity of the gift. Here, the tr~n~fer was
made by delivering up his own certi·ficates
and having new certificates issued to the
donees in lieu thereof. Therefore, the
transfer of the stock was rightfully made
and completed, and vested in the transferees
the legal title to the stock. For t~at reason a manual delivery of the newly issued
sto~k was not necessary to complete the gift.
115 P.2d at 318.
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After reviewing numerous cases supporting the law quoted
above, the court affirmed the lower court's decision.
In Fesmire v. First Union National Bank of North Carolina,
267 N.C. 589, 148 S.E.2d 589 (1966), a donor brought suit to recover possession of stock she claimed by reason of inter vivos
gift.

The facts were tmdisputed.

The donor had endorsed stock

certificates issued to him and placed them in an envelope bearing
the donee's name which was then placed in a safety deposit box
in his bank.

Moreover, a brother of the deceased donor testified

that in a conversation with the deceased, the deceased stated
that he "had given" the disputed shares to the donee, his long time
secretary and fiancee.
On this evidence, the trial court upheld the gift.

The North Carolina court affirmed, noting:
It is not essential, however, that the article
be placed beyond the physical power of the donor
to retake it, as is illustrated by the case of a
gift of coins to a child by dropping them in a
container recognized as the property of the child
though the containe~ itself, remains in the home
of the donor and thus subject to his physical control. Furthermore, when there has been an actual
transfer of possession with the requisite intent,
the gift is not defeated by the subsequent return of
the article to the possession of the donor for
safekeeping, or its return to a contain-~r or place
of deposit owned and controlled by the donor.
148 S.E.2d at 592 (citations omitted).
Moore v. Van Tassell, 58 Wyo. 121, 126 P.2d 9 (1942),
dealt with yet another similar fact situation.
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There, plaintiff
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brought suit for declaratory judgment that he held ownership in
certain stocks allegedly given to him by his stepfather.

The

evidence showed that the deceased stepfather during his lifetime had directed cancellation of his certificate for shares
in a family corporation of which he was president and majority
shareholder and issuance of a new certificate made out in the
plaintiff's name.

The new certificate was signed by both the

deceased donor and the secretary of the corporation as officers,
but the stepfather allowed the certificate to remain in the
secretary's safety deposit box throughout his lifetime.

As in

the cases discussed earlier, there was no evidence of physical
delivery of the certificate to the donee.

The lower court found

for the plaintiff donee.
On appeal, the Wyoming court reviewed numerous cases

from other jurisdictions and secondary authorities that had
directly addressed the issue of whether manual delivery of
certificates is necessary to complete a gift of stock.

It

then affirmed the trial court's decision, adopting the rule
that:
There is a complete gift of corporate
stock where, by the direction of its owner,
it has been transferred to the donee .. on the
books of the corporation, and a new certificate issued in the name of the donee, or a
certificate is issued in the first instance
in the name of the donee, although the
certificate so issued is retained by the
donor or the corporation, and not delivered
to the donee.
126 P.2d at 14, quoting from 99 A.L.R. 1077, at 1080.
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Applying the principles announced in cases discussed
and the rule quoted above, the court ruled:
It is plain that Mr. Van Tassell [the
donor] did all he could to place the legal
title to the shares of stock evidenced by
Certificate No. 8, aforesaid, in Granville
Moore [the donee] when the result Mr. Van
Tassell desire to accomplish is considered.
126 P.2d at 14.
Likewise, in Owens v. Sun Oil Company, 482 F.2d 564
(10th Cir. 1973), the Tenth Circuit ruled that under Arkansas
law physical delivery of a stock certificate was not a prerequisite to consummation of the gift of stock.
trix of the donee's estate brought

In Owens, the achninistra-

action against the corporation

for conversion when the corporation canceled stock in decedent's
name and reissued it to the donor, an aunt of the deceased.

Prior

to the death of her nephew, the aunt had directed the corporation
to cancel a certain stock certificate in her name and to reissue
a certificate in her nephew's name.

On the same day that the

new certificate arrived at the aunt's bank, the nephew was killed.
The corporation appealed from a jury verdict sustaining
the validity of the gift, claiming that physical delivery is a prerequisite to consummation of a gift of stock.

·The Tenth Circuit

affirmed the validity of the gift, holding that "issuance of the
stock in the name of {-the donee] along with evidence of [the aunt's]
intent, was sufficient to sustain the burden of showing intent to
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make a present gift and effective delivery."
(3)

482 F.2d at 568.

Commercial statutes do not preempt the law of inter

vivos gifts.
Appellants' argument that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act
and the Uniform Commercial Code require that a donor make actual
manual delivery of certificates of stock to his donee to effectuate a valid inter vivos gift is equally unpersuasive.

Although

cases cited by appellants in support of their proposition do mention the commercial statute in their reasoning, those statutes do
not appear to have been decisive.

In each instance, both dona-

tive intent and deli very were found lacking.
Most jurisdictions that have directly considered the applicapability of commercial statutes to the law of gifts have concluded

if!

that such statutes are not controlling on the issue of what acts

1

t

1

are sufficient for deli very of a gift.

Ir:

For example, the Illinois Court in Frey v. Wubbena,

di

' 26 Ill. 2d 62, 185 N. E. 2d 850 ( 1962) , disapproved the application
'1~

of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act in Shinsaku Nagano v. McGrath,

I

· 187 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1951), a case cited in Brief of Appellants
1

rn

at page 22.

·
The issue in Frey was whether t h e act o f p 1 acing

~!title to corporate stocks in joint tenancy was a sufficient
11

act to constitute delivery necessary for a gift of the shares of

~stock.

The donees, daughters of decedent, relied on Chicago

&Title and Trust Co. v. Ward, 332 Ill. 126, 163 N.E. 319 (1928),

i~which held that transfer of registration of stocks on the corii:porate books was sufficient to effectuate a gift where a father
had delivered the certificates to the corporation for reissue to
his daughter but had thereafter retained the new certificates.
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On the other hand, the widow of decedent relied on Shinsaku and

the Uniform Commercial Code to defeat the gifts for want of actual
delivery of the certificates.
In refusing to apply the commercial statutes to a gift
question, the court stated:
We have read with interest the case of
Shinsaku Nagano v. McGrath, (7th Cir.) 187
F.2d 753, which adopts the view that the
doctrine of the Ward case is no longer the
law in Illinois because of the effect of the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1961, chap. 32, par. 416) which has since
been replaced by the Uniform Commercial
Code (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1961, chap. 26, par. 8
-- 309) effective July 1, 1962. We do not
regard the act as being intended to govern
a gift situation such as that presented in
Ward or here.
185 N.E.2d at 857 (emphasis added).
The Iowa Court in Kintzinger v. Millin, 254 Iowa 173,
117 N.W.2d 68, (1962), took a similar position.

That case was

a probate proceeding contesting the validity of a testator's inter
vivos gift of 3,700 shares of corporate stock to his son.

The

trial court based its decision that the gift was void on the sole

grotmd that delivery was ineffective where the testator had endorsed.::
certificates representing the stock, had directed that the certificates be sent to the corporation and reissued in the name of his
son, and had executed an assignment; but where the certificates
had not been reissued, the book change had not been made, and actual delivery of the certificates to the son had not been made by
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the donor.
Appellees argued that prior case law holding actual delivery
not essential to a gift of corporate stock had been overruled by
the adoption of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.

In response to

this argument, the court reasoned:
[A]lthough some decisions are to the contrary
by what we think is the weight of authority
which we are persuaded to follow, the rights
of the parties as between themselves are not
affected by the provisions of the Uniform Act.
They were enacted for the protection of the
corporation, so it might safely deal in payment
of dividends or otherwise with the person in
whose name the stock was registered. Hausfelder
v. Security-First National Bank, 77 Cal.App.Zd
478, 176 P.2d 84, 88; In re Antkowski's Estates,
supra, 286 Ill. App. 184, 3 N.E.2d 132, 137; In
re Hill's Estate, 30 Ill.App.2d 243, 174 N.E."20
235;· State v. Schofield, 136 La. 702, 76
So. 557, 564; Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., supra,
132 Ohio St. 21, 4 N.E.2d 917, 920; Gugle v. Gugle,
Ohio App., 78 N.E.2d 585, 587; In re Conne!!'s
Estate, 282 Pa. 555, 128 A. 503, 38 A.L.R. 1362,

rn,

1365.

.

117 N.W.2d at 76.

The court also noted that, even if applicable, the
, Uniform Act does not require manual delivery to the donee person-

-, ally and nor does the law independent of the statute.

~

~

~
~

Therefore,

relinquishment of the certificates to the corporation with the
intent to vest ownership in the donee was as effectual as manual
delivery.

The trial court decision was reversed on this basis.

Henderson v. Tagg, 68 Wash.2d 188, 412 P.2d 112 (1966),
is another case which held the Uniform Stock Transfer Act inapplic-
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able in a gift case.

In an action by the donee of a gift against thE

executors of the estate, the parties stipulated at trial that the
donor intended to make a gift of the corporate stock to the donee
and that he had delivered stock certificates representing 300
shares of stock to the corporation with instructions to transfer
ownership to the donee.

The trial court entered jdugment for the

plaintiff-donee, ruling that the donor had done all that was necessary for the transfer of the stock.
On

appeal, the executors relied on the Uniform Stock Trans·

fer Act provisions requiring delivery of stock certificates to
effectuate a transfer of ownership of stock.

After noting that a

strict reading of the Act would require some sort of manual trans·
fer of the certificates, the Washington court stated:
-It seems to us that such a rule is unduly
restrictive in its interpretation of the underlying purpose of the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act, and unnecessarily rigid in the application
of its pertinent provisions. In this respect,
the reasoning of the Iowa Supreme Court in the
recent case of Kintzinger v. Millin is persuasive.
412 P.2d at 115 (citation omitted).
The court concluded:
We are, therefore, persuaded to apply the
more flexible rules of personal property
law in ascertaining whether or not a gift
was consununated. . . .
Id.
The trial court decision finding the gifts valid was
affirmed.
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In McClements v. McClements, 411 Pa. 257, 191 A.2d 814
(1963),a case discussed earlier in this brief, appellant relied
on the Uniform Stock Transfer Act to support her argument that
the actual delivery of certificates of ownership is essential
to effectuate a gift of stock.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this appeal in
the following language:
While it is true that the Pennsylvania Uniform
Stock Transfer Act of May 5, 1911,
P.L. 126, §21, 15 P.S. §321, (Repealed 1953),
provided that a person to whom a certificate
of stock is issued was to be regarded as the
real owner, this was not conclusive of the
rights between a donor and a donee: Connell's
Estate, 282 Pa. 555, 128 A. 503, 38 A.L.R. 1362
(1925). See also, Chatple's Estate, 332 Pa.
168 2 A.2d 719, 121 A. . R. 422 (1938).
191 A.2d at 816.
The court ruled that the evidence was sufficient to sustain
the lower court's conclusion that the deceased had intended to make
the gift of stock to his sons and that transfer of ownership on the
corporate books was sufficient delivery notwithstanding the lack
of evidence of actual delivery of the certificates.
While this Court has never directly considered whether
or not the Uniform Stock Transfer Act or the Uniform Connnercial
Code should govern gift situations, Jackson v. James, 97 Utah
41, 89 P.2d 235 (1939), decided a similar issue and is instructive

here.
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In Jackson, the trial court upheld an inter vivos gift
of an automobile claimed by plaintiff to have been given to her
as a wedding present by defendant's intestate.

On

appeal, defendant

argued that the gift was void as a matter of law because the ownership registration had not been transferred in accordance with a motor
vehicle registration statute which provided that "delivery of

any

vehicle . . . shall be deemed not to have been made and title thereto
shall be deemed not to have passed, and said intended transfer shall
be deemed to be incomplete and not to be valid" unless the registration was transferred in the office of the State Tax Cotmnission.
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Utah Supreme
Court looked to the purpose and scope of the motor vehicle statute
to determine that it did not govern the gift question presented
in that case:
In the light of the whole chapter it is evident that its provisions were written to protect innocent purchasers and third parties from
fraud but was not intended to be controlling
as between the parties to the transaction.
It may well be doubted that the legislature
could make mandatory any such formalities as
a prerequisite to transfer of title as between
the parties. It can of course prescribe such
rules to be effective as to third parties . . . .
89 P.2d at 237.
Jackson and the preceding cases from o·t.her jurisdictions
are consistent with the scope and purpose of the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code and with Utah inter vivos gift law.

The Commer-

cial Code was intended to govern commercial transactions only and
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ownership and transfer provisions were enacted to protect corporations.
There is no indication that the Legislature intended that the Code
preempt the common law of inter vivos gifts which does not specify
that particular acts be performed to consummate a gift of stock.
Rather, gift law looks to all the facts and circumstances surro'IID.ding a gift to determine whether the donor has performed acts
to carry out his intent to transfer ownership from himself to the
donee.
Of course, even if the commercial statutes were applicable
to gifts of stock, provisions requiring "delivery" are not necessarily
limited to actual manual delivery of certificates from the donor
to the donee.

"Delivery" means voluntary transfer of possession.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 70A-l-201(14)(1953).

Delivery

occurs when a purchaser or a person designated by him acquires possession of a security.

Id., Section 70A-8-313.

Thus, delivery

can occur where the donor voltmtarily transfers possession from
himself to the donee, even where the donee is not in actual possession of the certificates of stock.
CONCLUSION
Respondent, Rod Ross respectfully submits that this Court
should affirm the judgment of the trial court for the following
reasons:
~

1.

Each of the gifts of stock made by the decedent to

Rod Ross was valid and complete;
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2.

All of the disputed shares

3.

Respondent met his burden of proving these inter

a~e

the property of Rod

Ross;

vivos gifts by clear and convincing evidence; and

4.

Appellants have offered no persuasive reason to

reverse the trial court's judgment.
This result would, no doubt, be the result intended by
the decedent.

Without a compelling reason to void these gifts,

this Court should give full effect to the decedent's intent.
DATED this :.li_ day of July, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Kenneth W. Yeates
Patricia M. Leith
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

Attorneys for Respondent, E. Roderick
Ross
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